Whether you envision the advent of this new year with trepidation—as some sort of technocratic Armageddon—or placidly, as little more than a fly in the ointment, the issues regarding campaign finance reform are certain to provoke continuing discussion well into the millennium. Accepting, for the sake of argument, that campaign finance issues will continue to develop conflicting viewpoints (Republican and Democrat), the debate should not be about partisan politics or personalities. Campaign finance reform is about money. In the end, it is the money that will announce to the electorate who runs, who wins, and how they govern. Unfortunately, the cost of competing in today's political climate is at an all-time high—and spiraling upward. In 1996, the average cost for winning a seat in Congress was $3.765 million for a senatorial campaign and $675,000 for the House of Representatives (Eagleton). In the absence of any foreseeable restraint, the questions will continue to be asked: How much is enough, how much is too much, and what are the tradeoffs?

First, we should recognize the efforts of those who are opposed to campaign finance reform and their unwavering invocation of First Amendment rights granted by the United States Constitution. Those fighting fiscal reform, traditionally Republicans, contend that a ban on political action committees, "voluntary" spending limits, restrictions on soft money, and regulation of issue advocacy all substantially infringe upon First Amendment freedoms. Similarly, reform opponents suggest the matter goes beyond protocol and policy right to the Constitutional guarantee that "Congress shall make no law, . . .abridging the freedom of speech." In defense of their position, they refer ad infinitum to the two major provisions of the 1974 campaign reform legislation struck down by the United States Supreme Court in 1976: Mandatory spending limits, restrictions on spending for all federal candidates, and finally, the limits on how much money a candidate may contribute to his or her own campaign were all overturned in Buckley v. Valeo. In the spring of 1997, a constitutional amendment to allow Congress to set such limits was advanced by Democratic Senator Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina and Republican Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania. It was overwhelmingly voted down (Cong. Rec.).

The large amounts of money required to launch and maintain a national political campaign cannot be overstated. It takes money to pay staffers and purchase materials. It takes money to be noticed by the media. It takes money to afford the kind of political consultation and direction necessary to win. It takes money to raise more money. But more than any other aspect of a successful campaign, it takes money for television and radio advertising to get the message (and, where possible, the candidate's face) across. For example, the advertising avalanche launched by the Clinton-Gore campaign in the fall of 1995 overwhelmed all competing messages while it constantly fine-tuned and repeated the Democratic candidates' message. Those ads, paid for not by the Clinton-Gore campaign but by the Democratic National Committee, cost about $44 million ("Democrats' TV Ads"). In Congressional campaigns, the dollar amounts are significantly lower, but money still plays a major role in who is elected to office and who is left holding the bag. Big coffers scare away would-be challengers in an arena where advertising may determine who wins and who loses. As a result, members of Congress spend a lot of time and energy—and money—raising funds for their next election.

Ideally, the only commodities in the political marketplace are ideas. The best ideas are what sell; in this marketplace, voters are the consumers, and they make their selections in the polling booth. To whatever extent politicians grant access or support their benefactors' policy considerations, the people and interests being catered to have one thing in common: money. That alone is offensive to some campaign finance reform groups. They believe moneyed interests hold too much sway in the political world—at the expense of the poor—and they argue for strict limits on campaign spending and fund-raising. The reality of modern politics is that access and attention, if not policy, are all for sale to the highest bidder. Alliances with the wealthy are easy to make and difficult to break. Integrity, independence, and virtue are lofty goals but soon may be abandoned at the behest of a major political donor. Over the years, Congress has given billions of dollars in tax relief to industries and special-interest groups that have made contributions to candidates' parties or individual campaigns. In the final analysis, the question becomes which came first: the chicken or the egg? The money or the vote? Major contributors in the 1996 Clinton-Gore campaign were literally able to buy time with the President—one of the rarest and most valuable resources in Washington, D.C. Despite the Clinton Administration's steadfast denials of impropriety in its fund-raising activities during the course of the 1996 presidential election, a sizeable contingent of voters felt that the issue of spending money in an effort to express a biased viewpoint exceeded the First Amendment right to free speech.

The first major set of campaign finance reforms was signed into law in early 1972 by then-President Richard Nixon. Ironically, his re-election committee went on to funnel illegal corporate contributions into slush finds, pay for break-ins, and trade cash for personal favors. After the Watergate hearings, campaign laws were revisited and revised. The resulting Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 was significant for several reasons. First, it established the Federal Election Commission (FEC) as campaign police. Second, it established stiff disclosure requirements and set limits on campaign donations. And finally, it instituted public financing of presidential elections.

While it remains controversial, supporters of publicly financing presidential elections insist it is worth spending federal tax dollars to replace a system that encourages the unchecked solicitation of private funds. Fueled by the voluntary check-off on tax forms (now $3), the Presidential Election Campaign Fund matches up to $250 of each contribution made to eligible primary candidates. In return, the candidates must promise that they will limit spending to a certain amount and follow certain other rules. Ultimately, in the general election season, the presidential candidates receive a lump sum in return for not accepting any further private donations. In 1996, for example, the Clinton and Dole campaigns each received about $75 million in taxpayer money after promising not to spend more than $111 million (with few exemptions). On the other hand, Steve Forbes, because he refused to accept public funding, was able to loan his own campaign $37.5 million to launch a media blitz during the last three months of 1995. Another independent candidate, Maurice Taylor, spent $6.5 million of his own money as well. While neither succeeded, Forbes did influence the Republican nomination process markedly by outspending even the eventual nominee, Kansas Senator Bob Dole, who was obliged to observe federal spending limits (Bill Summary, 106th Congress). 

As time has passed, politicians and special interest groups have found ways to circumvent many rules and regulations regarding campaign spending and donor contributions. With a 1979 amendment, federal election law was altered again, this time to the delight of politicians and fund-raisers. The law allows political parties to spend as much as they want, as long as the money goes to "party-building activities," such as "get-out-the-vote" efforts, and to generic advertising, such as "issue ads." This type of spending is called "soft money." Unlike "hard money," which is subject to firm limitations on contributions, soft money is essentially unregulated. There is no limit whatsoever on the amount donors may contribute, as long as the money finds its way into a "soft money" account.

While this practice of raising money began to flourish during the 1980s, in 1996 the combined Democratic and Republican parties took it to extremes, when together they amassed more than $262 million—three times more than what was raised in the 1992 elections (Robb, B9). In June 1996, the Supreme Court extended the same practice to Congressional campaign organizations by allowing them to spend without restraint, as long as they acted "independently" of the candidates. From that point on, the rapid growth in soft money was limited only by the creative bounds of political consultants in finding new ways to spend it. In reality, both parties violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the law. Starting in December of 1995, the Democratic National Committee used soft money to pay for the Clinton media blitz referred to above. Similarly, the Republican National Committee spent soft money on a sixty-second commercial crafted by Dole's advertising team with footage originally shot for the Dole campaign. The ad devoted fifty-six seconds to Senator Dole's biography and four seconds to the issues (Schier, BO2). 

Unions and other interest groups were similarly affected. Because they didn't have to finance their ads through political action committees (which, by law, could accept no more than $5,000 per candidate or $15,000 per party), the origin and amount of cash they spent did not have to be reported to the FEC. They, too, had supposedly crafted their ads to address issues and not a candidacy.

With the contribution and spending caps essentially neutered by the advent of soft money, excesses on both sides were pervasive. While self-indulgence was truly bipartisan throughout the 1996 election, it was the Democratic National Committee (DNC) that was ultimately linked to the most egregious conduct. The DNC has since announced that a number of the soft-money contributions were illegal or inappropriate and has returned more than $2.8 million, primarily to foreign nationals or people contributing on behalf of third parties. The White House was similarly engaged in fund-raising tactics that some consider questionable, at best. While nothing illegal happened, Clinton's approval of such actions was considered unethical and tacky. Apparently donors were invited to spend a night in the White House's Lincoln Bedroom or to meet with the President over coffee. While perhaps innocent in its intent, this action gave Presidential access to some persons later found to have dubious backgrounds. Additionally, Vice President Gore reportedly spoke by telephone from his White House office with numerous persons in an effort to secure large contributions to the DNC. Federal law generally bans federal employees from raising campaign cash from federal property. Republicans and others found no recourse in the Federal Election Commission. With three commissioners from each party, a recipe for gridlock, the FEC could provide little insight into the problem and no credible enforcement capability. Additionally, the commission had seen its budget and authority dwindle over time, thanks to Congress and the courts.

The public as well as party leaders agree that something needs to be done about the way we finance our political campaigns. Historically, however, when it reaches this point, stark differences about how to proceed seem to flourish. It boils down to "How will this reform help or hurt me?" Democrats generally support limits on soft money and spending because they feel somehow handicapped by the Republicans' ability to raise funds from the wealthy. Some Republican leaders have even suggested raising the current limits for individual contributions, which they say would reduce the time and energy spent on fund-raising. Deadlines to pass reform legislation have been set and then ignored. In June 1995, Clinton and House Majority Leader Newt Gingrich famously shook hands before a group of senior citizens in Claremont, New Hampshire, and pledged to create a bipartisan commission to reform campaign finance. It never happened.

In 1998, definitive campaign reform legislation was introduced in both houses of Congress. The Senate bill was co-sponsored by Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona and Democratic Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin. A counterpart bill was introduced later that year in the House of Representatives, co-sponsored by Republican Chris Shays of Connecticut and Democrat Martin Mechan of Massachusetts. While the language of both proposals would bolster the law already in existence, Shays-Mechan, much like McCain-Feingold, would also mandate the following:

• Bar state as well as national parties from raising or spending soft money. Instead, all contributions would be subject to limits that now apply to hard money. 

• Prevent soft money from being rechanneled into independent expenditures by drawing a line between issue advocacy and outright advocacy of a particular candidate, including a ban on using a candidate's name or likeness within sixty days of an election.

• Require expanded and speedier disclosure of contributions and expenditures, including electronic filing, and impose stronger penalties for violations (Bill Summary, 106th Congress). 

Democrats supported the legislation, along with sixty-one Republicans in the House who had broken ranks with their party. The bill languished in the Senate under the supposition that any attempt to establish mandatory spending limits would likely run afoul of the Supreme Court's Buckley v. Valeo ruling. In the meantime, fund-raising proceeded at a record pace. Democrats and Republicans together raised about $74 million during 1997, more than double what they raised during the same period only four years earlier (McConnell, 36).

What does this mean for the year 2000 and beyond? With an open checkbook, will the national political parties grow stronger than ever before and essentially make the decisions as to who will hold office and who will not? Where are you now, Joe DiMaggio? America needs a real hero—not someone embroiled in the smoke-filled room trappings, but a President for all the people. In his book, No Way to Pick a President: How Money and Hired Guns Have Debased American Elections, Jules Witcover writes, "The campaign finance system, with its incalculable costs and unworkable regulations, has forced anyone who wants to run for president to cheat one way or another" (280). He goes on to say, "The 'hired guns' have instilled a campaign mentality that preaches that anything goes. Whatever it takes to win is done, the only caveat being that one's tactics should not be so egregious that they backfire" (280). Well spoken.

Literature Cited

Bill Summary and Status for the 106th Congress. S.26. "Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1999." Summary.  Thomas Legislative Information on the Internet. 14 March 2001. <http://thomas.loc.gov>.

Congressional Record, 105^th Cong., 1^st sess., 1997, 143, 697-710.

"Democrats’ TV Ad Attacks GOP on HMOs, Medicare." Washington Post 10 November 1999 , A22. 

Eagleton, Thomas F. "To Win an Election: Money and Organization." Dec. 1997. Washington University in St. Louis Editorial Services. 8 March 2001. <http://www.news-info.wustl.edu/opeds97/EagletonDec97.html>.

McConnell, Mitch. "The Money Gag." National Review 30 June 1997, 36-38.

Robb, Robert. "Campaign Reform Is Doomed." The Arizona Republic 6 Oct. 1999, B9.

Schier, Steven E. "Why Campaigns Are Now Like Target Practice." Washington Post 24 October 1999, B2. 7 March 2001. <http://www.newslibrary.com/nlsearch.asp>.

Witcover, Jules. No Way to Pick a President: How Money and Hired Guns Have Debased American Elections. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999.

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